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Restricting Adult Access to Material Obscene as to Juveniles
Within the morass of Supreme Court rulings regarding the relation
of the first amendment to pornography, 1 the Court's opinion in Ginsberg v. New York 2 created a paradox unparalleled even by its other
pornography decisions. In Ginsberg the Court upheld a novel speech
classification: material obscene as to juveniles but protected as to
adults. 3 The paradox thus created is that a judicial declaration that a
thing is "obscene" defoliates that thing's first amendment protection;4
yet in the absence of that classification - and assuming no other constitutional infirmities - speech is accorded the full battery of first
amendment privileges. The peculiarity of Ginsberg is that it allows
speech to be at once immune from restriction as to some (adults) and
completely prohibitable as to others (juveniles).
Although the Ginsberg Court acknowledged the state's right to
deny juvenile access to material5 that could not be denied to adults, it
did not indicate the extent to which - or even whether - a state's
right to withhold may infringe upon the adult's right to obtain. The
statute at issue in Ginsberg proscribed only the sale of specified pornography to minors; 6 hence, it was a relatively easy case because laws
1. For the purposes of this Note, nothing hinges on the precise coverage of the term "pornography." Webster's Third New International Dictionary will suffice: "l: a description of prostitutes or prostitution 2: a depiction (as in writing or painting) of licentiousness or lewdness: a
portrayal of erotic behavior designed to cause sexual excitement - compare erotica." For that
matter Justice Stewart's test for material of a saltier character is adequate: "I shall not today
attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within [the description 'hardcore' pornography] .... But I know it when I see it ...." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 197 (1964). "Obscenity," on the other hand, is a term of art meaning material that
"the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find •.. taken as
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and ... taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citations omitted). Obscenity, thus defined, is not
protected by the first amendment.
2. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
3. See Part I infra.
4. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
5. For simplicity, material obscene as to juveniles will also be referred to as "juvenile
obscenity."
6. The Court held that the state may "defin[e] obscenity on the basis of its appeal to minors."
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638. Unqualified obscenity retains no access rights; therefore, to define a
thing as "obscene" as to a specified sub-group is necessarily to grant the state a right to prohibit
that sub-group's access to the thing. Moreover, the Court states elsewhere:
[Appellant] insists that the denial to minors under 17 of access to material condemned by
[the challenged statute], insofar as that material is not obscene for persons 17 years of age or
older, constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation of protected liberty.
. . . We conclude that we cannot say that the statute invades the area of freedom of
expression constitutionally secured to minors.
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636-37 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
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that prohibit only the actual sale of juvenile obscenity cause, at worst,
quite minor inconvenience for adults. 7 However, state laws that also
forbid juvenile access to the same material starkly illustrate the uncertainty created by the Ginsberg holding. When a state forbids juvenile
access to the same material, the incidental effects upon adults are
greater, and the case is not so easy.
Indeed, faced with basically indistinguishable statutes, 8 federal
courts of appeals have split. The Eighth and Tenth Circuits, in Upper
Midwest Booksellers Association v. City ofMinneapolis 9 and M.S. News
Co. v. Casado 10 respectively, upheld state statutes outlawing commercial displays that permitted juvenile access to sexually oriented material deemed "harmful to minors." 11 More recently, however, the
Fourth Circuit in American Booksellers Association v. Virginia 12 struck
down the same sort of statute on two grounds. First, the regulation
"impose[d] restrictions based on the content of publications" and
therefore, the court reasoned, violated the familiar axiom that speech
regulations must be content-neutral. 13 But the statute's "most serious
flaw," according to the court, was its breadth. 14 Although acknowledging the state's interest in limiting the availability of sexually related
material to minors, the court held that any display method fit to the
task was "unduly burdensome on the first amendment rights of
7. The statute at issue in Ginsberg provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to exhibit for a monetary consideration to
a minor or knowingly to sell to a minor an admission ticket or pass or knowingly to admit a
minor for a monetary consideration to premises whereon there is exhibited, a motion picture, show or other presentation which, in whole or in part, depicts nudity, sexual conduct
or sado-masochistic abuse and which is harmful to minors.
2. A violation of any provision hereof shall constitute a misdemeanor.
N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 484-h (McKinney 1967), quoted in Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 645-47 (currently
codified in N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 235.21 (McKinney 1980)). "Minor" was defined as a person
under seventeen years of age and the definition of "harmful to minors" tracked the Supreme
Court's standard for obscenity. See text at note 17 infra.
8. In fact, the resulting inconvenience for adults is so meager that the Ginsberg Court ignored
it. Yet despite the fact that the Supreme Court acknowledged none, some first amendment rights
of adults are implicated by the Ginsberg ruling. Adults, particularly those of pubescent appear·
ance, may be compelled to furnish identification before purchasing material to which they have
constitutional rights. Moreover, the preliminary requirement of having to prove one's majority
might "for a variety of reasons," deter an adult from purchasing the material. Cf. American
Booksellers Assn. v. Virginia, 802 F.2d 691, 696 (4th Cir. 1986), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct.
1281 (1987) (No. 86-1034). That these are actual infringements becomes clear when one
imagines the probable reaction of the Court to a state law that required identification for the
purchase of, e.g., The Communist Manifesto.
9. 780 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1985).
10. 721 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1983).
11. MS. News, 721 F.2d at 1295-97 (Appendix); Upper Midwest Booksellers, 780 F.2d at
1406-08 (Appendix).
12. 802 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1986), prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 1281 (1987) (No. 86-1034).
13. American Booksellers Assn., 802 F.2d at 695. See Part II.B infra for a discussion of
content-neutrality.
14. American Booksellers Assn., 802 F.2d at 695. The overbreadth charge is discussed at
notes 84-90 infra and accompanying text.
1.
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adults." 15
This Note considers whether state regulations that restrict juvenile
access to material that is obscene as to minors unconstitutionally encroach upon the first amendment rights of adults. Part I briefly describes the Court's opinion in Ginsberg. Part II introduces the
"O'Brien 16 analysis" and discusses the aspects of juvenile access restrictions that tend to make O'Brien scrutiny applicable. In this context the frequently relaxed judicial review of governmental restrictions
on sexually related material will be discussed. Having concluded that
the O'Brien analysis is applicable to access restrictions, Part III applies
the test and ultimately concludes that juvenile access restrictions survive O'Brien scrutiny.

I. THE

BACKDROP: GINSBERG V. NEW YORK

The Ginsberg opinion itself resolves perhaps the most difficult
question posed by juvenile access restrictions by sustaining a separate
standard of obscenity for juveniles. In Ginsberg the Court considered
the constitutionality of a New York statute that forbade the sale of
material "harmful to minors." The statutory definition of "harmful to
minors" modified the Supreme Court's definition of obscenity by
adapting it to minors:
"Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement,
or sado-masochistic abuse, when it: (i) predominantly appeals to the
prurient ... interest of minors, and (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing
standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is
suitable material for minors, and (iii) is utterly without redeeming social
importance for minors. 17

Justice Brennan's majority opinion approved the concept of "variable
obscenity," noting that the statute at issue "simply adjusts the definition of obscenity 'to social realities by permitting the appeal of this
type of material to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests ... ' of
such minors." 18
Although the Court did not constrain legislatures to a particular
definition of "obscene as to minors," the statute upheld by the Court
was a reconciliation of the prevailing standard of obscenity with a
lower standard for minors. 19 A statutory definition of "obscene as to
15. American Booksellers Assn., 802 F.2d at 696.
16. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
17. N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 484-h (McKinney 1967), quoted in Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 645-47
(currently codified in N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 235.20 (McKinney 1980)).
18. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638 (quoting Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509 (1966)).
19. The Court's test for obscenity when Ginsberg was decided was the one announced in
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). However, that definition has since been replaced by
the standard established in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Adapting the current obscenity definition to the sensibilities of juveniles suggests that material is obscene as to juveniles
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juveniles" that simply modifies the current criteria for obscenity by
attaching the addendum "as to juveniles" is, therefore, constitutional.
Each of the three statutes that have come before the federal courts
of appeals basically conforms to this standard; which, because it is
" 'virtually identical to the Supreme Court's most recent statement of
the elements of obscenity,' ... gives 'men in acting adequate notice of
what is prohibited' and does not offend the requirements of due process."20 Therefore, arguments of the "slippery slope" genre, at least
regarding the breadth of the "juvenile obscenity" classification, are not
germane. If "obscene as to juveniles" improperly sweeps within its
scope Lady Chatterley's Lover, 21 it does so irrespective of whether the
bookseller must prevent juvenile access to the book or, as Ginsberg
allows, only refuse to sell it to juveniles.22
Ginsberg also establishes that the states have a substantial interest
in making the designated material unavailable to minors. The state's
interest in "the well-being of its children" and, in particular, its interest in placing "limitations upon the availability of sexual material to
minors" 23 was a necessary antecedent to the Court's approval of a juvenile standard of obscenity in Ginsberg. 24 Acknowledging that the
whenever (a) the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of minors; (b) the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way with respect to what is suitable for juveniles, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors. Cf. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. While it is
not clear that a more expansive definition of "obscene as to juveniles" would be unconstitutional,
the analysis of this Note will proceed on the assumption that the access restrictions in question
define juvenile obscenity within the constitutional demarcation announced in Ginsberg.
20. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 643 (quoting Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 76, 271
N.Y.S.2d 947, 953, 218 N.E.2d 668, 672, appeal dismissed sub nom. Bookcase, Inc. v. Leary, 385
U.S. 12 (1966), and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957)).
21. See Kingsley Intl. Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 360 U.S.
684 (1959) (reversing the Regents' denial of a license to show the motion picture version of Lady
Chatterley's Lover). But see Justice Harlan's dissent in Roth, 354 U.S. at 506 ("The fact that the
people of one State cannot read some of the works of D.H. Lawrence seems to me, if not wise or
desirable, at least acceptable.").
22. That is, the routine objection to any definition of obscenity - that it will render Huckle·
berry Finn naked before the censors - is relevant only to the Ginsberg decision itself, not to cases
dealing with access restrictions. See generally, e.g., Miller, 413 U.S. at 37-47 (Douglas, J., dis·
senting) (objecting that the announced obscenity test "would make it possible to ban any paper
or any journal or magazine in some benighted place," 413 U.S. at 44). If state enforcement
officers demand blinder racks for Huckleberry Finn, the Constitution will have been violated not
by the restriction of access to juvenile obscenity, but rather by the misapplication of the juvenile
obscenity standard itself. But the Ginsberg definition of juvenile obscenity is a settled constitu·
tional issue. Access restrictions should not reignite definitional objections.
23. The well-being of its children is of course a subject within the State's constitutional
power to regulate, and, in our view, ... justif{ies] the limitations in [the juvenile obscenity
statute] upon the availability of sex material to minors under 17, at least if it was rational for
the legislature to find that the minors' exposure to such material might be harmful.
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639.
24. "We ... cannot say that [the statute], in defining the obscenity of material on the basis of
its appeal to minors under 17, has no rational relation to the objective of safeguarding such
minors from harm." 390 U.S. at 643.
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sexually explicit material at issue did not qualify as pure obscenity and
therefore retained constitutional protection as to adults, the Court
observed:
That the State has power to [create a distinct standard of obscenity for
minors] seems clear, for we have recognized that even where there is an
invasion of protected freedoms "the power of the state to control the
conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults
"25

To the extent that the Court permits an "invasion" of freedoms otherwise guaranteed by the Constitution it abrogates their status as "protected freedoms." 26 The state's interest partially ejects this material
from the category of first amendment speech. Consequently, as to minors, juvenile obscenity has the constitutional status that outright obscenity has with regard to the population at large: it is not "speech" of
the first amendment. Absent the adult world, state prohibitions on
juvenile access to Ginsberg-type material would be constitutionally
flawless.
On the other hand, absent the juvenile population and the attendant state interest in the welfare of its children, juvenile access restrictions would unquestionably fall. 27 Access restrictions inevitably
impose inconveniences on adult pornography purchasers. Blinder
racks, sealed covers, or separate rooms for adults obstruct adult access
to material that is fully protected as to adults. Thus, Ginsberg creates
a category of expression that is simultaneously "speech" and "nonspeech." Laws that seek to regulate the nonspeech element - juvenile
access - inescapably touch the speech element - adult access.

O'BRIEN TEST
A. The Test
In United States v. O'Brien, 28 the Court announced a test of constitutionality for regulations that affect both speech and nonspeech.
O'Brien had burned his draft card publicly "so that other people
would reevaluate their positions with Selective Service, with the armed
forces, and reevaluate their place[s] in the culture of today, to hopefully consider [O'Brien's] position." 2 9 He was immediately arrested
and ultimately convicted of violating the Universal Military Training
II.

THE

25. 390 U.S. at 638 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)).
26. "Obscenity" and "free speech" are mutually exclusive categories and the Court held this
material obscene as to juveniles. See generally Schauer, Speech and "Speech" - Obscenity and
"Obscenity": An Exercise in tlze Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899
(1979).
27. The requisite countervailing state interest is not limited to a concern with the well-being
of its youth. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (city's interest in
the quality of its neighborhoods justifies a restriction on the exercise of first amendment rights).
28. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
29. 391 U.S. at 370.
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and Service Act. 30
Noting that the violation was not premised on the public or expressive character of the card's destruction, the Court compared the putative abridgement of free speech to "a motor vehicle law prohibiting the
destruction of drivers' licenses, or a tax law prohibiting the destruction
of books and records. " 31 Yet, O'Brien's expressive activity did suffer,
and this is what the Court's test addressed. A governmental regulation of conduct that involves both "speech" and "nonspeech" elements
will not be invalidated, the Court held, "[1] if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; [2] if the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [3] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."32 Although first
amendment rights were closely intertwined with the activity regulated,
the Court concluded that the governmental interest in the regulation
was limited to "insur[ing] the continuing availability of issued certificates." Thus, the Court upheld the law under which O'Brien was
convicted.
The peculiarly disjointed nature of juvenile obscenity - nonspeech
as to the direct regulatees, speech as to those incidentally regulated seems to track the O'Brien speech/nonspeech paradigm. 33 In fact, the
strict language of O'Brien suggests that the O'Brien analysis controls
whenever there is a nonspeech object in a governmental regulation affecting speech. However, the Court may have claimed a broader range
for its test than it would be willing to apply in practice. Determining
whether access restrictions fit within the more limited range of practice requires that the unspoken prerequisite to O'Brien analysis be
exposed.
B.

The Latent Exception to the Applicability of the O'Brien Test

It is possible to imagine governmental regulations of speech that
would clear each of the O'Brien hurdles but which would be held unconstitutional, nonetheless. Professor John Hart Ely suggests that an
30. Codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(b) (1982) (construed in 391 U.S. at 370).
31. 391 U.S. at 375.
32. 391 U.S. at 377. As originally stated, the test also includes the requirement that the
regulation be "within the constitutional power of the Government." This segment of the test is
omitted from the text because, as Professor Ely has observed, "[I]t is superfluous in light of the
most natural reading of what is designated criterion [1]." Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in
the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482,
1483-84 n. 10 (1975).
33. Commentators have generally agreed that the O'Brien approach is not limited to symbolic speech. See, e.g.. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 580-601 (1978); Ely, supra
note 32; Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 47074 (1980); Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEo.
L.J. 727, 742-47 (1980); Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 113, 126-27 (1981).
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anti-handbilling ordinance intended to reduce litter would be such a
law. 34 The governmental interest is substantial, unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and arguably promoted by no less restrictive alternative.
In Schneider v. New Jersey (Town of Irvington), 35 however, the
Court struck down an anti-handbilling ordinance on first amendment
grounds. Commentators have explained the Schneider case as an exception to the O'Brien test for speech in "traditional" or "public"
fora. 36 Public forum speech, unlike the symbolic speech involved in
draft card burning, is at the core of first amendment freedoms. It has
been argued, therefore, that an implicit prerequisite to the O'Brien test
is that the speech incidentally affected be outside this core. 37 Alternatively, it might be argued that even if there is no formal "exception" to
O'Brien, the Court nonetheless reserves O'Brien analysis for regulations that by their nature warrant lenient scrutiny. 38
There is little doubt of the Supreme Court's view that juvenile obscenity is not at the core of first amendment freedoms nor otherwise
deserving of special protection, at least since Young v. American Mini
Theaters. 39 Young c~ncerned the constitutionality of a Detroit zoning
ordinance which prohibited adult theaters, bookstores, and cabarets
from locating within certain distances from other regulated businesses
or residential areas. 40 The city justified the ordinance with the argu34. Ely, supra note 32, at 1484-90.
35. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
36. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 32 at 1486-87. Thus, according to Ely, state regulations of

speech in conventional fora ·will not be subject to O'Brien analysis, even if the restriction of
expression is incidental. Instead, such regulations will receive a "serious balancing version ofless
restrictive alternative analysis." Id. at 1488.
37. See Ely, supra note 32, at 1488-89. The public forum exception itself has never been
acknowledged by the Court. Instead the Court has reconciled the anti-handbilling ordinance at
issue in Schneider with O'Brien analysis by claiming that the anti-handbilling ordinance violates
O'Brien's requir~ment that statutes incidentally restraining speech be the least restrictive alternative. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808-10 (1984). It is
violated by an anti-handbilling ordinance, according to the Court, because the government could
simply "eliminate the exact source of the evil it sought to remedy" by proscribing littering. 466
U.S. at 808.
38. The Court has never failed to uphold a regulation analyzed as an incidental restriction
under O'Brien. See Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem ofIncidental Restrictions on Communications, 26 WM. & MARYL. REv. 779, 787-88 (1985); see also Arcara v. Cloud
Books, 106 S. Ct. 3172 (1986); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789
(1984); Heffron v. International Socy. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1980);
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
39. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
40. The ordinance classified a bookstore or theater as an "adult establishment" if it presented
"material distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, decribing, or relating to 'Specified Sexual Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical Areas.'" The ordinance defined
"Specified Sexual Activities" as:
1. Human Genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal;
2. Acts of human masturbation, sexual intercourse or sodomy;
3. Fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals, pubic region, buttock or female
breast.
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ment that a concentration of adult establishments leads to a general
deterioration of the neighborhood. 41 The Court, speaking through
Justice Stevens, upheld the ordinance as a "[r]easonable regulation[]
of the time, place, and manner of protected speech,"42 noting that
"[t]he mere fact that the commercial exploitation of material protected
by the First Amendment is subject to zoning and other licensing
requirements is not a sufficient reason for invalidating these
ordinances. " 43
The more interesting part of Justice Stevens' opinion is the portion
joined by only three other justices. 44 There, Justice Stevens responded
to the theaters' challenge under the equal protection clause by pointing out that "[t]he question whether speech is, or is not, protected by
the First Amendment often depends on the content of the speech."45
As for expression "on the borderline between pornography and artistic
expression,"46 Stevens asserted that "society's interest in protecting
this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude
than the interest in untrammeled political debate."47 Stevens noted
that the restrictions applied irrespective of "whatever social, political,
or philosophical message" the designated material conveyed, and concluded from this fact that "the government's paramount obligation of
neutrality" was fulfilled. 48 Because the speech regulated in Young was
of little value, or in Stevens' colorful phrase, because "few of us would
And "Specified Anatomical Areas" was defined as:
1. Less than completely and opaquely covered: (a) human genitals, pubic region,
{b) buttock, and (c) female breast below a point immediately above the top of the areola; and
2. Human male genitals in a discernibly turgid state, even if completely and opaquely
covered.
Detroit Zoning Ordinance, effective Nov. 2, 1972, quoted in Young, 427 U.S. at 53.54 nn. 4 & 5.
These definitions of sexual motifs resemble the statutory description of material obscene as to
juveniles upheld in Ginsberg. Cf note 7 supra.
41. Young, 427 U.S. at 54-55.
42. 427 U.S. at 63 n. 18.
43. 427 U.S. at 62.
44. Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice Rehnquist joined all of Justice Stevens'
opinion. Justice Powell joined the holding as to time, place, and manner regulation, but declined
to join part III of Justice Stevens's opinion, which deals with distinctions among types of pro·
tected speech. Instead, Justice Powell concurred on the ground that reasonable zoning regula·
tions should be analyzed under O'Brien, and that under that analysis the Anti-Skid Row
ordinance was constitutional.
45. 427 U.S. at 66. Justice Stevens elaborated:
Thus, the line between permissible advocacy and impermissible incitation to crime or vio·
lence depends, not merely on the setting in which the speech occurs, but also on exactly
what the speaker had to say. Similarly, it is the content of the utterance that determines
whether it is a protected epithet or an unprotected "fighting comment." And in time of war
"the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops" may
unquestionably be restrained, see Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716,
although publication of news stories with a different content would be protected.
427 U.S. at 66 (footnotes omitted).
46. 427 U.S. at 61.
47. 427 U.S. at 70.
48. 427 U.S. at 70.
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march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right
to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theater of our
choice"4 9 - the Detroit ordinance was upheld. 50
Regardless of whether one agrees that first amendment protection
ought to diminish as one drifts away from a conceptual "core,"51 the
Young plurality opinion can at least be taken to confirm that pornographic material is not at that core. 52 Consequently, even if the Court
is discriminating in its application of O'Brien, juvenile access restrictions present precisely the type of issue which should receive O'Brien
scrutiny. The idea that protected speech can be stratified according to
its value, and that sexual speech occupies a lower stratum, was flatly
asserted in Young. Moreover, the definition of juvenile obscenity parallels that of the "Specified Sexual Activities" in Young. 53 It, too, "is
49. 427 U.S. at 70.
50. The holding in Young was recently affirmed by a majority of the Court in Renton v.
Playtime Theaters, 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986). For additional examples of lenient first amendment
review of state regulations of sexually oriented speech, see Arcara v. Cloud Books, 106 S. Ct.
3172 (1986) (first amendment not violated by enforcement against adult bookstore of New York
statute allowing closure of premises found to be used as place for prostitution and lewdness);
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (distribution of child pornography held not entitled to
first amendment protection provided the conduct to be prohibited is adequately defined by the
applicable state law); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (first amendment does not
prohibit FCC regulation of broadcast dealing with sex and excretion); California v. LaRue, 409
U.S. 109 (1972) (state regulations prohibiting explicitly sexual live entertainment and films in
bars and other establishments licensed to dispense alcoholic beverages by the drink sustained
against first amendment challenge); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (material not
obscene as to the "average person" may nonetheless be unprotected by the first amendment
where the material is designed for and distributed primarily to a clearly defined deviant sexual
group if the theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest of the members of that group).
51. The proposition that first amendment protection for constitutional "speech" can vary
based on the value of speech is hotly contested within both the Court and the academic community. One opponent of speech valuation, Justice Stewart, dissented in Young, insisting that no
speech may be deemed "less worthy of constitutional protection." Indeed, Stewart asserted,
"[l]n the absence of a judicial determination of obscenity, it is by no means clear that the speech
is not 'important' even on the Court's terms." 427 U.S. at 87 (Stewart, J., dissenting). For commentary critical of speech valuation, see, e.g., Stone, Restrictions ofSpeech Because ofits Content:
The Peculiar Case of Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 82-83 (1978); Farber,
supra note 33, at 746-47; Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U.
CHI. L. REV. 20, 31 n.55 (1975).
52. Taken alone, Young might be precedent for upholding juvenile access restrictions solely
on the basis of their low - albeit extant - first amendment value, thus functioning as an alternative to O'Brien analysis. Like Detroit's "Anti-Skid Row Ordinance," access restrictions circumscribe, but do not suppress outright, the availability of nonobscene sexually explicit material. In
Young, the city's interest in the character of its neighborhoods, without more, sufficed to sustain
the Detroit zoning ordinance. If Young formed the sole precedent for limited regulation of sexually related speech, then the governmental interest in limiting the availability of sexual material
to juveniles, which received explicit constitutional sanction in Ginsberg, might be sufficient to
sustain juvenile access restrictions without reference to the O'Brien test.
It is beyond the purpose of this Note to enter the speech valuation fray by positing Young and
its progeny as an alternative to O'Brien analysis. However, it is significant that the Court tends
to relax its scrutiny of regulations of sexual speech even when the effect on speech is not merely
incidental.
53. Compare note 7 supra with note 40 supra.
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on the borderline between pornography and artistic expression," and
therefore, according to Young, implicates "surely a less vital interest
. . . than . . . the free dissemination of ideas of social and political
significance." 54 Recognition that the Court has on occasion acknowledged the low value of nonobscene sexually explicit material makes
the case for O'Brien analysis extremely strong even if the O'Brien precedent is taken at its weakest.
Access restrictions undoubtedly do not fit the implicit public forum exception to sustenance under O'Brien - the commercial display
of books and magazines is not a traditional forum for exercising free
speech rights. 55 Indeed, access restrictions implicate a form of speech
for which the Court has shown strikingly little solicitude. 56 Thus, any
implicit prerequisites to the application of O'Brien are met with respect to statutes restricting access to juvenile obscenity.
Ill.

APPLYING

O'BRIEN

The first of O'Brien's three criteria requires that a regulation further an "important or substantial governmental interest." 57 Ginsberg
establishes beyond cavil that a statute restricting juvenile access to material that is obscene as to minors satisfies this criterion. 58 Only the
second and third criteria remain to be analyzed.
A.

Unrelated to the Suppression of Free Expression

The second criterion, that the governmental interest be "unrelated
to the suppression of free expression,"59 is the heart of the O'Brien
test. 60 Its mandate can be broken down into two separate inquiries:
whether the regulation advances a genuinely nonspeech object and
whether this nonspeech object forms the rationale for the regulation.
A skeletal version of the first inquiry must, of course, have been satisfied in order to merit O'Brien scrutiny in the first instance. But even
the most egregious speech infringements can claim some nonspeech
purpose such as "danger of riot, unlawful action or violent overthrow
54. 427 U.S. at 61.
55. In fact, commercial advertising had little first amendment protection until the 1970s.
Compare Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), with Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
56. But see Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), in which the Court struck
down an ordinance that prohibited drive-in movie theaters from displaying any film containing
nudity ifthe screen was visible from a public street. In that case, however, the Court found that
the proscribed nudity "cannot be deemed obscene even as to minors." 422 U.S. at 213.
57. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The full O'Brien test is quoted in the text accompanying note
32 supra.
58. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639-43. See also Part I supra.
59. 391 U.S. at 377.
60. Professor Ely refers to this portion of the O'Brien analysis as "what is obviously intended
as the definitive statement of [the Court's] test." Ely, supra note 32, at 1496.
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of the government." 61 Under the second criterion the Court must determine whether a genuine nonspeech object animates the regulation:
criterion two is the nonspeech requirement in earnest.
The crucial inquiry under the second criterion according to Professor Ely is "whether the harm that the State is seeking to avert is one
that grows out of the fact that the defendant is communicating ... or
rather would arise even if the defendant's conduct had no communicative significance whatsoever."62 Thus, for example, the O'Brien Court
found that because the prohibition on draft card burning did "not distinguish between public and private destruction, and ... [did] not punish only destruction engaged in for the purpose of expressing views," it
was not the communicative aspect of O'Brien's conduct that the government sought to regulate. 63 Rather, the purpose of the regulation
was to ensure the "smooth and efficient functioning of the Selective
Service System. "64
The nonspeech object of the regulation upheld in O'Brien seems
fundamentally different from the nonspeech object of juvenile access
restrictions. Far from unrelated to the communicative impact of the
regulated conduct, access restrictions define the material regulated on
the basis of its content. Only material that "appeals to the prurient
interest" of juveniles, "depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way" with respect to what is suitable for juveniles, and "lacks serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value" is subject to regulation. 65
The sole rationale for restriction is that the expressive content of this
material is harmful to juveniles.66
At the base of this "communicative impact" inquiry is the contentneutral doctrine which underlies much first amendment analysis. The
content-neutral precept holds that "above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." 67 All
of this seems to bode ill for state restrictions on juvenile access to pornography - the communicative content of juvenile pornography provides the exclusive justification for access restrictions.
Yet the content-neutral canon is of questionable relevance to regulations on juvenile obscenity. If content discrimination were uniformly unconstitutional, it is the Court's "obscene as to juveniles"
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1497.
63. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 375.
64. 391 U.S. at 382.
65. See text at note 17 supra.
66. Indeed, it is the communicative impact of juvenile obscenity that both places it outside
the protection of the first amendment as to children and inside the first amendment's scope as to
adults.
67. Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
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holding itself that would be invalid, not the resulting state regulations.
And that argument not only comes too late, but also misconceives the
content-neutrality requirement.
Content neutrality assumes that the regulated expression is protected; it does not govern ~he determination of protection in the first
instance. 68 Otherwise every governmental regulation would be potentially subject to first amendment scrutiny. Robbery, treason, and withholding one's tax returns might all conceivably contain expressive
content, but laws proscribing these activities do not violate the first
amendment. The reason that laws against robbery do not violate the
first amendment is not because they survive the O'Brien test, but
rather because robbery - based on its content or "communicative impact" - is excluded from first amendment protection. 69 Thus, content neutrality is required only when the regulated activity is within
the ambit of the first amendment.
Juvenile obscenity is banished from the realm of first amendment
protection - with regard to juveniles. And it is exclusively to minors
that access restrictions direct their attention: juvenile obscenity shall
not be displayed where minors may have access. 70 With respect to
juveniles, these regulations have the same first amendment status as
laws against full-fledged obscenity, robbery, or the nonspeech element
of draft card burning: they do not implicate first amendment speech.
Although access restrictions incidentally affect the protected speech
interests of adults, they primarily affect the nonspeech interests of
juveniles. The governmental interest in circumscribing a minor's access to juvenile obscenity is therefore an interest "unrelated to the suppression of free expression." 71
Analysis of juvenile access restrictions under the second criterion
would end here if the second criterion required that the asserted governmental interest be "unrelated to the suppression of free expression." By adverting only to the governmental interest, however, the
O'Brien test seems to invite inquiry into legislative motive. Yet, notably, Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court in O'Brien explicitly
rejected consideration of legislative motive for the purpose of invalidating an otherwise constitutional statute: "We decline to void essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation which Congress had
68. On the distinction between coverage and protection, see, e.g., F. SCHAUER, FREE
SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 89-92, 134-35 (1982); Schauer, supra note 26, at 920. See
generally Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. Cr. REV. 1.
69. That is, if the communicative impact of the formulation, "This is a stick-up" is that the
statement is in jest or part of a theatrical production, then the expression is not a robbery and,
absent other disabilities, is probably protected by the first amendment. But if the communicative
impact reveals that the speaker intends a compulsory transfer of funds, his expression is simply
not first amendment speech. See Schauer, supra note 26, at 905 n.34 (citing cases in which the
Supreme Court has denied first amendment coverage to communication as part of an illegal net).
70. See text at notes 75-77 infra.
71. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
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the undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in its
exact form if the same or another legislator made a 'wiser' speech
about it. " 72 According to O'Brien, the Court would look to legislative
history only as an aid in interpreting the legislation.73 In determining
whether the governmental interest furthered by access restrictions is
unrelated to the suppression of free speech, therefore, the Court presumably will look no further than to the interest apparent on the face
of the statute. 74
A constitutionally permissible objective is necessarily embodied in
the language of juvenile access restrictions. For example, the disputed
regulation in American Booksellers provided, "It shall be unlawful for
any person ... to knowingly display for commercial purpose in a manner whereby juveniles may examine and peruse [material obscene as to
juveniles]."75 In Upper Midwest Booksellers the regulation at issue
stated, "It is unlawful for any person commercially and knowingly to
exhibit [or] display . . . any material which is [obscene as to
72. 391 U.S. at 384. In the context of the O'Brien case, Warren's statement was not mere
dictum: a cursory glance at the legislative history of the Selective Service regulation at issue
would have been likely to reveal an improper legislative motive. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note
33, at 596-97.
73. To be sure, Supreme Court examinations of legislative history have resulted in the invalidation of otherwise constitutional statutes often enough to call Warren's disclaimer into question.
See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (state statute authorizing a moment of silence for
prayer or meditation struck down solely on the basis of legislative history indicating an intent to
promote school prayer). However, close examinations of legislative motives have tended to be
restricted to equal protection cases. For example, in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233 (1936), the Court invalidated a tax on newspaper advertisements based on the circulation of
the newspaper because, "in the light of its history and of its present setting, [the tax was] seen to
be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to
which the public is entitled." 297 U.S. at 250.
Moreover, in no case analyzed under O'Brien has the Court "void[ed] a statute ... constitutional on its face, on the basis of what [the legislators] said about it." O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 384.
Indeed, in Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986), the Court cited O'Brien in explicitly rejecting the court of appeals' theory that "if 'a motivating factor' in enacting the ordinance
was to restrict [the] exercise of First Amendment rights the ordinance would be invalid, apparently no matter how small a part this motivating factor may have played in the City Council's
decision." 106 S. Ct. at 929, quoting Playtime Theaters v. Renton, 748 F.2d 527, 537 (9th Cir.
1984). Thus, because the "predominate concerns" of the City Council "were found to be with the
secondary effects of adult theaters, and not with the content of adult films themselves," 106 S. Ct.
at 929, the ordinance was sustained. Even in Grosjean, the Court's appraisal of the legislative
animus derived not from any legislative history of the tax but from the face of the provision itself:
"The form in which the tax is imposed is in itself suspicious. It is not measured or limited by the
volume of advertisements. It is measured alone by the extent of the circulation of the publication
.... " 297 U.S. at 251.
At least in the context of incidental restrictions on speech, it seems that Warren's prescription
for the proper use of legislative history in adjudication survives.
74. Even if one were to conclude that the Court were willing to inquire into legislative motive
in spite of Chief Justice Warren's admonition to the contrary, the question of whether juvenile
access restrictions result from impure motives could not be answered in the abstract. Arguably
access restrictions could result from improper motives, but one could only discover that by examining an actual legislature's actual legislative enactment and legislative history. Cf. note 78

supra.
75. American Booksellers Assn., 802 F.2d at 693 n.2.
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juveniles]."76 The contested provision in M.S. News declared, "No
person having custody, control or supervision of any commercial establishment shall knowingly: ... display material which is [obscene as
to juveniles] in such a way that minors ... will be exposed to view
such material." 77 The similarity is not coincidental: this phraseology
represents the simplest manner of effecting the governmental purpose
of limiting juvenile access to sexually explicit material, a purpose legitimated in Ginsberg. Because the language of the access restrictions
that have come before the federal courts of appeals most naturally suggests a governmental interest "unrelated to the suppression of free expression," the second part of the O'Brien test is satisfied by these
statutes.78
B.

No Greater Than Is Essential to the Furtherance of the
Governmental Interest

Once it is established that a particular regulation is supported by a
"substantial governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression," the restriction on first amendment rights must be
shown to be "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest." 79 Herein lies the final hurdle posed by O'Brien.
This least-restrictive-alternative analysis presupposes that the legislature has chosen a particular alternative from among a number of
measures which might have advanced the legislative purpose. However, none of the access restrictions considered by the federal courts of
appeals mandate a particular means to the end of preventing a minor's
access to juvenile pornography. so Unlike statutes that ban specific con76. Upper Midwest Booksellers, 780 F.2d. at 1407 (Appendix).
77. M.S. News, 721 F.2d. at 1296 (Appendix).
78. Conceivably, a legislature could enact a statute which on its face revealed an intent to
constrain adult access to juvenile obscenity. But the face of the statute would betray such an
improper motive only if it included restraints superfluous to restricting the access of minors - in
which case it would be something more than a juvenile access restriction.
Moreover, even in the face of evidence that a legislative body thought the adventitious impediment to adults' first amendment freedoms a happy consequence of prohibitions on juvenile access, it is difficult to believe that this effect of the statute could actually be more important to the
legislators than the effect on juvenile access, or that the interest in regulating juvenile access to
pornography could be a mere pretext for restraining adult access. The preeminent objective inevitably furthered by such laws is to place the material out of the reach of minors. Hence, such
statutes necessarily further a nonspeech governmental interest untainted by improper legislative
motives.
79. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
80. The access restrictions at issue in the M.S. News and Upper Midwest Booksellers cases did
prescribe measures that would be deemed compliant, but these were not exclusive and were
largely redundant in any case. For instance, the statute considered in Upper Midwest Booksellers
excepted from its purview material enclosed in opaque covers, elaborating: "The requirement of
an opaque cover shall be deemed satisfied concerning such material if those portions of the cover,
covers, or packaging containing such material harmful to minors are blocked from view by an
opaque cover." MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. ORDINANCE§ 385.131(6)(a), quoted in 780 F.2d at 140708 (Appendix).
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duct as an intermediate step toward advancing the governmental interest, these statutes simply state the governmental purpose and place the
chosen means to that end in the hands of the bookseller. Incidental
restrictions on speech that do "no more than eliminate the exact
source of the evil [the legislature] sought to remedy" 81 allow no less
restrictive alternative analysis. If the state is permitted to eliminate
the perceived evil, such regulations will be upheld.
Moreover, a legislature could presume that the self-regulating
bookseller would choose the least restrictive method of compliance be it a separate room for adults, opaque covers, or blinder racks - on
account of his profit motive. 82 Particular bookstores and types of juvenile obscenity may be amenable to different sorts of restrictions, and a
general prohibition on juvenile access permits the storekeeper to
choose any combination of restraints that furthers the governmental
interest. The sole alternative is to specify a single or several permissible display methods which would limit the available modes of compliance. In other words, the only other means of furthering the
government's interest would very likely be more restrictive. 83
On the other hand, broadly phrased prohibitions arguably constitute a greater restriction because of their potential to "chill" speech.
If particular compliance methods are not enumerated, a bookseller
might opt for maximum restriction, or discontinue the sale of juvenile
obscenity altogether. In discussing the difficulty a bookseller would
have in attempting to comply with Virginia's access restriction the
Fourth Circuit implicitly raised the danger that nonspecific access restrictions pose to the first amendment rights of adults. 84 The court
81. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984).
82. The bookseller's remunerative incentive resembles that presumed to goad the "orator" of
commercial speech. In the commercial speaker's case, the assumed profit motive justifies, in
part, the limited first amendment protection accorded his expression. See Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976)
("[C]ommercial speech may be more durable than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua
non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and
foregone entirely."). Obviously, it will be in the bookseller's interest to adopt the display method
that sells the most juvenile obscenity to adults, and it seems reasonable to assume that this will be
the method that infringes least on the first amendment rights of adults.
83. Particularity could only approximate the range of options available to the bookseller
under a general statute if the enumeration of compliance methods were exhaustive or reduce his
options if the enumeration were less than exhaustive.
84. American Booksellers, 802 F.2d at 695-96. Oddly, the court indicates that one of the
problems with the statute is that the definition of the affected material is not clear. For instance,
the court discusses the divergent opinions of the bookstore owners and the government as to the
amount of the booksellers' inventory that would be covered concluding that "[i]t cannot be gainsaid ... that book retailers face a substantial problem attempting to comply with the [regulation]
in ordering, [and] reviewing ... publications for sale." 802 F.2d at 696. But because this portion
of the statute mimics the law sustained in Ginsberg, it is immune from constitutional challenge
and any alleged definitional ambiguities are irrelevant. Compare VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-390,
18.2-391, 18.2-391.1 (Supp. 1987), with N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 484-h, supra note 7.
Moreover, the restriction struck down was an amendment to a Virginia law that forbids the
sale of the same material to juveniles. Thus, Virginia booksellers face precisely the same "sub-
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declared that the access restriction's breadth constituted its "most serious fiaw." 85 Because, in the words of the court, the statute required
that material obscene as to juveniles "not be displayed so that minors
may have access to [it]," 86 the court interpreted the regulation to mandate displays impenetrable by "any determined juvenile. " 87 A
uniquely determined juvenile, however, will not jeopardize a
merchant's compliance method because the statute includes a scienter
requirement: "It shall be unlawful ... to knowingly display for commercial purpose in a manner whereby juveniles may examine and peruse [material obscene as to minors]." 88 The rare juvenile incursion
into prohibited territory will not give the bookseller "reason to know
or a ... ground for belief" 89 that his method is inadequate. 90
Whether the unequivocal notice provided by specificity is less restrictive than the latitude afforded by generality in an access restriction is, at best, a close call. Close calls require judicial deference to the
legislative choice. As the Court said when addressing the claim that
the National Park Service's prohibition on sleeping in Lafayette Park
was not the least speech-restrictive means of preventing damage to the
Park:
We do not believe ... that either United States v. O'Brien or the time,
place, or manner decisions assign to the judiciary the authority to replace the Park Service as the manager of the Nation's parks or endow
the judiciary with the competence to judge how much protection of park
lands is wise and how that level of conservation is to be attained. 91
stantial problem ... in ordering [and] reviewing ... publications for sale" irrespective of the
display restriction since they must be able to identify the material that they cannot sell to minors.
85. 802 F.2d at 695.
86. 802 F.2d at 696 (emphasis in original).
87. 802 F.2d at 696.
88. VA. CODE ANN.§ 18.2-39l(a) (Supp. 1987).
89. The Virginia access restriction defines "knowingly" as "having general knowledge of, or
reason to know, or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry.''
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-390(7) (Supp. 1987).
90. On the other hand, an access regulation that simply required particular display methods
- while clear enough to guide a law-abiding merchant - might not prevent juvenile access in
fact. If the ordinance were lawfully complied with even as hordes of minors flipped through
material on the "adults only" shelf, it would not serve its intended purpose. Cf. Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 425 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Indeed, the State's claim of
concern over this problem is undermined by the general practice [which allows evasion of the
purported interest]"). Absent a rational relation to a constitutionally permissible state interest in this case, shielding juveniles from sexually explicit material - the state cannot randomly
regulate a bookstore owner's display methods.
The access restrictions upheld by the Eighth and Tenth Circuits proffered suitable compli·
ance methods but these were defined in terms of their actual capacity to shield juveniles from
exposure to the material. See, e.g., note 80 supra. Thus, a bookseller who adopted one of the
suggested measures would not be deemed in compliance unless his display method actually prevented juvenile access in any event.
91. Clark v. Community For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984) (footnote
omitted). See also Young, 427 U.S. at 71 ("It is not our function to appraise the wisdom of [the
city's] decision to require adult theaters to be separated rather than concentrated in the same
areas.''); Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 106 S. Ct. 925, 931 (1986) ("We .•. find no constitutional
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Neither specificity nor generality in access restrictions seems
clearly "greater than is essential to the furtherance of [the governmental] interest." Both types, therefore, satisfy the last of the O'Brien
test's requirements. Restrictions on juvenile access to material obscene as to minors are constitutional under the O'Brien analysis.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although declamations that the first amendment is blind to the
value of speech punctuate the Court's first amendment rulings, many
of the Court's opinions explicitly or implicitly rely on the relative
value of the affected speech. The most salient class of speech toward
which the Court tends to disregard the content-neutrality dictum is
nonobscene pornography - speech that teases the prurient appeal
standard while remaining constitutionally chaste. Material obscene as
to juveniles is unquestionably speech of this type; as to minors, it goes
so far as to satisfy the prurient interest criterion. Clearly that fact
alone does not end the inquiry. Speech valuation at its strongest
means that, as to adults, this material is of low first amendment value
- not no first amendment value.
But because restrictions on sexually related nonobscene speech are
frequently accorded lenient first amendment scrutiny, the O'Brien test
is uniquely apposite. Although the Supreme Court may hesitate
before applying O'Brien analysis to some incidental restrictions on expression, regulation of material obscene as to juveniles and on the edge
of obscenity as to adults is not one of those.
Moreover, the O'Brien test does not require that the speech affected be of a type that "few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve." 92 Rather, O'Brien requires only that the
regulation further an "important or substantial governmental interest
... unrelated to the suppression of free expression" in a manner least
restrictive of first amendment rights. 93 O'Brien scrutiny thus obviates
the need for an acknowledgement that material obscene as to juveniles
is of low first amendment value.
·
O'Brien's three-part analysis provides an effective filter against the
principal hazard posed by such regulations: that they will become vehicles for the suppression of protected speech. State laws that prohibit
juvenile access to material that is obscene as to minors, however, serve
the same important governmental interest that the Court relied upon
in Ginsberg. And because juvenile obscenity is nonspeech as to
juveniles, the governmental interest primarily advanced by juvenile acdefect in the method chosen by Renton to further its substantial interests.... '[T]he city must be
allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems.' "
(quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 71)).
92. Young, 427 U.S. at 70.
93. 391 U.S. at 377.
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cess restrictions is unrelated to the suppression of free speech. Finally,
when juvenile access restrictions state their commands in general
terms which directly advance the governmental interest, there exists
no less restrictive alternative.
Future legislative enactments regulating material obscene as to minors, however, may be less circumspect in their mandates. The first
amendment demands that juvenile access restrictions, though primarily affecting nonspeech, be tailored as narrowly as possible, to avoid
abridging the legitimate speech rights of adults. For such a purpose
was the O'Brien test designed.

-Ann H. Coulter

